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The emergence of global tax governance was triggered by
common tax problems, which are now still being faced by
international society of nation-states. In the creation of this
framework, international institutions have been playing a
major role. One of these institutions is the World Bank
(Bank). However, those who write about the virtues and
vices of the main creators of the framework usually disre-
gard the Bank. This article, therefore, argues that this disre-
gard is not justified because the Bank has also been playing
a prominent role. Since two informal decisions taken in the
past have contributed to this position of the Bank, the article
gives in addition to it answers to the following two related
questions: whether these informal decisions of the Bank
were legal and if so, what implications, if any, they have for
the Bank’s legitimacy.
Keywords: World Bank, legality, legitimacy, global tax gov-
ernance, tax policy and tax administration reforms
1 Introduction
Taxes are usually a (main) source of income for many
modern states1 and can thereby have a direct impact on
their existence. Consequently, the questions ‘whether to
tax?’ and – if so – ‘to what extent?’ are considered to be
issues that touch upon state sovereignty, which should
be respected and protected by international law. How-
ever, in today’s world, tax issues seem no longer con-
fined to nation-state territory. Rapid technological
advancements and acceptance of neoliberal capitalism as
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1. There are nowadays – to my knowledge – no states that form their
complete budget from sources other than taxes. Even the countries that
are listed as ‘tax havens’ derive a part of their income from taxes such
as value added tax, customs and import duties, and sometimes even
from corporate income tax.
the guiding economic ideology in the world2 evoked tax
competition among states.3 This tax competition has
subsequently become one of the causes of disparities
between the domestic tax systems of states,4 leading to
the current worldwide aggressive tax planning practice
with massive avoidance of direct taxation by multina-
tional enterprises (MNE) and high-net-worth individu-
als (HNWI).5
Tax avoidance and evasion are not new phenomena.
Every state with a capitalist economic system that
derives its income from taxes has to do with it.6 The
current avoidance in direct taxation, however, has a far
further impact that goes well beyond national borders.
Disparities between national tax legislations, sometimes
combined with bilateral tax treaties that are supposed to
remove double taxation, result in division of the world’s
wealth among states and within a state in a way that was
not always intended with creation of these legal meas-
ures. These implications have lifted direct tax issues7
2. Before the fall of communism in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the
Cold War practically divided the world into two rival camps: the West
and the East. After its fall, neoliberal capitalism spread from the West to
the East.
3. Capitalism considers ‘capital’ as the major factor of production. Conse-
quently, every state tries to attract as much as capital through many
various legal and non-legal measures. One of the legal measures con-
cerns taxation: capital exporting countries try not to burden their capi-
tal, while capital importing countries try to attract as much capital as
possible through tax legislation and conclusion of tax treaties. The phe-
nomenon that results from these regulatory actions of states in the field
of taxation is called in the literature as tax competition.
4. But tax laws of some states – even though not created with the aim of
attracting investment or capital – may just differ from each other, which
would lead to similar disparities.
5. Strictly speaking, the former is a legal vehicle that aims to benefit indi-
viduals, among whom is the latter group.
6. Capitalism is based on the concept of private property – including capi-
tal – and the principle of maximisation of gains from this private proper-
ty. On the one hand, the state should not own anything owing to the
concept of private property. On the other hand, the state should not
have any – or the least possible – control over private property. This loss
of state control is aggravated by the understanding that taxes are a bur-
den on private property, which made the payment of taxes ‘undesired’
or ‘involuntary’. As a result of it, some people (try to) evade or avoid
taxation, while taxes – though not directly aimed at maximisation of the
gains from the private property or capital – are necessary for the exis-
tence of a state that should maintain this capitalist system through the
provision of public goods.
7. Indirect taxes are already harmonised on the regional level (e.g. in the
European Union) or coordinated by the WTO on the international level.
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from the domestic to the international level by making
them one of the major problems – next to environment
or security – that have to be tackled on a global level.
The global financial and economic crisis in 2008 placed
the issue only on top of the political priority list by
drawing the attention of the Group of Twenty (G20).8
These international direct tax problems can, however,
not be solved unless the reign of neoliberal capitalism is
ended9 or a jointly coordinated action among states is
initiated against them that should mitigate the adverse
effects of neoliberal capitalism. The former is not an
option now as the neoliberal capitalism with its market-
oriented economy – though not a perfect one – seems to
be a system that is being aspired to by the most people
in the world. Furthermore, its current alternatives seem
to be various forms of nationalism and communism, all
with their own flaws. The latter option – the coordina-
tion of tax policies on an international level – has there-
fore been advocated by many scholars within academia
and is being embraced by the world’s political and eco-
nomic leaders as a solution to these problems.10 And
since international institutions (IIs)11 are perfectly suit-
ed to such endeavours, a handful of them that were
already active in the field of taxation were, accordingly,
entrusted with this task. This designation subsequently
led to the initiation – as well as supervision of the imple-
mentation – of a surge of tax policy norms seemingly
aimed at tackling international tax problems. As a result,
these IIs created a framework encompassing all these
processes, which is termed by some scholars as ‘global
tax governance’ (GTG).12
8. Since its London Summit in April 2009, the G20 has shifted its focus on
direct tax issues. See <https:// www. theguardian. com/ business/ 2009/
mar/ 20/ g20 -tax -haven -blacklist> and <https:// www. oecd. org/ g20/
topics/ taxation/ > (last visited: 9 October 2017).
9. Many problems of international taxation result, in my opinion, from the
current globalisation, which is based on neoliberal capitalist principles.
These neoliberal principles are deregulation (downsizing the role of the
government), liberalisation (market liberalisation through, inter alia,
removal of trade and capital barriers) and privatisation (privatisation of
state properties). Privatisation shifted capital from the state into the pri-
vate domain. Liberalisation made the capital mobile, and deregulation
loosened the control of the state over private capital. However, I do not
say with this that ending neoliberal capitalism is the best option to solve
these problems.
10. G20 and G-8 have been endorsing the international tax cooperation
during their meetings. See I.J.M. Valderrama, ‘Legitimacy and the Mak-
ing of International Tax Law: The Challenges of Multilaterlism’, 7 World
Tax Journal (2015).
11. I understand by this term not only intergovernmental organisations
(IGOs), but also other forms of cooperation such as transnational net-
works and platforms. As Junne indicated, national governments are
usually reluctant to entrust IGOs with this task. Consequently, other
alternative structures for international coordination were regarded to be
more suitable for that purpose. See G.C.A. Junne, ‘International organi-
zations in a period of globalization: New (problems of) legitimacy’, in J.
Coicaud and V. Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of international
organizations (2001) 189, at 211-19.
12. I refer here to the scholars who understand under this framework pro-
cesses that create and implement such international norms. However,
some scholars seem to understand by this term the norms that are
being created. See J. Wouters and K. Meuwissen, ‘Global Tax Gover-
nance: Work in Progress?’, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Stud-
ies Working Paper, at 59 (2011) and P. Dietsch and T. Rixen (eds.),
Global Tax Governance: What Is Wrong and How to Fix It (2016).
Those who write about the virtues and vices of the main
creators of this framework usually disregard the World
Bank (Bank),13 which in my opinion is not justified. I
will therefore try to depict how and to what extent the
Bank participates in the creation and implementation of
such tax policy norms. Since these modes of participa-
tion of the Bank are based on its two related informal
decisions to expand its activities into, respectively,
domestic and international tax fields, I will explore these
activities separately in two successive subsections. Sub-
sequently, I will make an attempt to answer – equipped
with the tools of legal doctrinal method14 – the following
two questions: whether these decisions of the Bank were
legal; and if so, what implications, if any, they have for
the Bank’s legitimacy. But before discussing all these
matters, I will provide an overview of the Bank’s most
important features in the following section.
2 Overview of the Bank
2.1 Introductory Remarks
There are not very many intergovernmental organisa-
tions (IGOs) in the world that are as well known among
people as the Bank. Yet their knowledge about this insti-
tution is usually vague, limited or erroneous because of
the complexity of this IGO. Hence, an overview of the
most important aspects of the Bank is presented in Sub-
sections 2.2. to 2.5. These aspects will not only enable
us to understand this IGO, but also serve as a basis for
making an analysis in Section 4 to answer the research
questions posed earlier.
2.2 Structure and Mandates
The Bank is one of the prominent global players in the
field of development. In July 1944, the foundation for
this multilaterally established IGO was laid down
through the creation of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) by represen-
tatives of 44 states at the Bretton Woods Conference.15
After the entry into force of its Articles of Agreement
(Articles) in 1946, the IBRD officially started its work
with 38 members.16 At that time, the majority of its
members were located in Europe and the western hemi-
sphere.17 The activities of the IBRD have been supple-
mented by the International Development Association
13. I refer herewith only to two lending institutions of the World Bank
Group: the IDA and IBRD. See more about it in Section 2.1. of this arti-
cle.
14. Conceptual analysis and moral reasoning.
15. This conference, officially called the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference, was held from 1 to 22 July 1944 in Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, the USA. See <http:// worldbank. org/ en/
about/ archives/ history/ exhibits/ bretton -woods -monetary -conference>
(last visited 8 October 2017) and D. Kapur, J.P. Lewis & R. Webb, The
World Bank: Its First Half Century – Volume I: History (1997), at 9.
16. I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays
and Lectures – Volume II (1995), at 2.
17. Nine of these states were from Asia and Africa, and the rest belonged
to Europe and the western hemisphere. See id.
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(IDA) from 1960.18 Such a move was necessary since the
IBRD was not allowed to provide ‘concessional’ lending
(zero or very low interest credits) or grants from its cap-
ital.19 Both lending institutions operate under the
Bank’s name and have one and the same staff and
project evaluation standards.20 Together with three oth-
er affiliates – the International Finance Corporation
(1956), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(1988) and the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (1966) – the Bank belongs to the
World Bank Group (WBG).
According to Article I of its Articles, the IBRDs main
mandate is ‘to assist in the reconstruction and develop-
ment of territories of members by facilitating the invest-
ment of capital for productive purposes’. In conformity
with this mandate, the reconstruction of Europe after
World War II initially formed the Bank’s main mission,
and the first non-project reconstruction loans were pro-
vided to Western European states.21 But shortly after its
start, the bilateral United States’ Marshall Plan replaced
the Bank’s work in those states.22 And as West Europe
began to show clear signs of recovery, the Bank decided,
in the late 1950s, to focus entirely on loans for develop-
ment, shifting its activities to its developing members.23
For a long time, the Bank understood ‘development’ to
mean ‘having dams, bridges, and a (relatively) high
GNP per capita’.24 Later, during the Presidency of Rob-
ert S. McNamara at the Bank, ‘poverty alleviation’ or
‘the guarantee of a certain level of welfare to one’s popu-
lation’ became another component of development.
Since 2013, the Bank has had twin goals that should
reach this development: ‘eradicating the extreme pover-
ty and boosting shared prosperity’.25 In addition to this
mandate, the IBRDs Articles mention other purposes of
this institution such as promotion of ‘the long-range
balanced growth of international trade and maintenance
of equilibrium in balances of payments (emphasis added)
by encouraging international investment for the devel-
opment of the productive resources of members’,26 pro-
motion of ‘private foreign investment by means of guar-
antees or participation in loans and other investments
made by private investors’27 and supplementation of
‘private investments by providing, on suitable condi-
tions, finance for productive purposes out of its own
18. Art. I of Articles IDA (Effective 24 September 1960).
19. IDA 13, ‘The IDA Deputies: An Historical Perspective’, IDA (November
2001), at 1.
20. F.J. Garcia, ‘Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Problem of
Inequality’, Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, at 5 (2008).
21. The IBRD’s first loans were provided to France, the Netherlands, Den-
mark and Luxembourg in 1947. See Kapur et al. (1997), above n. 15, at
10.
22. The official name of this bilateral assistance was the ‘European Recovery
Program’. It was announced in June 1947. Id.
23. In 1948, the Bank provided its first loan for developmental purposes to
Chile. See M. Finnemore, National Interests in International Society
(1996), at 94.
24. Id., at 92.
25. World Bank Group, The World Bank Group A to Z (2016), at 67.
26. Art. I (iii) of Articles IBRD.
27. Art. I (ii) of Articles IBRD.
capital, funds raised by it and its other resources’.28 The
IDA has a similar mandate, which is pursuant to its
Articles ‘to promote economic development, increase
productivity and thus raise standards of living in the
less-developed areas of the world included within the
Association’s membership, in particular by providing
finance to meet their important developmental require-
ments on terms which are more flexible and bear less
heavily on the balance of payments (emphasis added)
than those of conventional loans, thereby furthering the
developmental objectives of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (hereinafter called
“the Bank”) and supplementing its activities’.29
Although these mandates are extensively interpreted in
practice by the Bank’s management, the founding docu-
ments contain one explicit limitation to this possibility of
interpretation:30 prohibition of political activity.31
2.3 Organisation and Distribution of Voting
Power
The IBRD nowadays consists of 189 members or ‘share-
holders’.32 The membership of IBRD is, however, con-
ditional on the membership of International Monetary
Fund (IMF), which is open only for sovereign states.33
A state may acquire membership of the IDA if it has
membership of the IBRD.34 At the moment the IDA
has 173 members.35 These members together hold in
principle the ultimate policy-making power on any issues
that determines the course of the Bank. In practice,
however, the members have a say only in matters con-
cerning each of the institutions of the Bank through
their (Alternate) Governors in the Boards of Governors
(BoGs).36 The BoGs consist of one Governor and one
Alternate Governor appointed by each member.37 The
appointed (Alternate) Governors at the IBRD serve ex
officio as the (Alternate) Governors of IDA, provided
that states that they represent have membership of the
IBRD.38 Any meetings of the BoGs are considered to be
validly held when the majority of all Governors, who
together represent two-thirds of the total voting power
of that particular organisation, are present.39
As the BoGs usually convene once a year during the
WBG and IMFs Annual Meeting in autumn,40 they
28. Id.
29. Art. I of Articles IDA.
30. Shihata (1995), above n. 16, at 132-33.
31. To be found in: Art. III (5[b]); Art. IV (10); and Art. V (5[c]) of the IBRD
Articles. Also in Art. V (1[g]); Art. V (6); and Art. IV (5[c]) of the IDA
Articles.
32. See <http:// worldbank. org/ en/ about/ leadership/ members#1> (last vis-
ited 9 October 2017).
33. Art. II (1) of Articles IBRD.
34. Art. II (1) of Articles IDA.
35. See <www. worldbank. org/ en/ about/ leadership/ members#2> (last vis-
ited 9 October 2017).
36. Art. V (2[a]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (2[a]) of Articles IDA.
37. Art. V (2[a]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (2[b]) of Articles IDA.
38. Art. VI (2[b]) of Articles IDA.
39. Art. V (4[f]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (2[f]) of Articles IDA.
40. The BoGs may convene on their own decision or on the BoD’s request
more than once a year. See Art. V (2[c]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI
(2[d]) of Articles IDA.
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delegated their powers – with the exception of some41 –
to the Boards of Directors (BoDs).42 The BoDs are
responsible for the Bank’s general operations43 and con-
sist of the Bank’s President and 25 Executive Directors
(EDs).44 According to Article V, Section 4, Subsection
b Articles of IBRD, five of these EDs are appointed by
the IBRDs 5 largest shareholders,45 whereas the rest are
nominated out of several constituencies by other mem-
bers.46 The IDAs BoDs is composed ex officio of each
(Alternate) ED at the IBRDs BoDs, provided that they
represent members having IBRD membership.47 The
BoDs gather twice or more often per week.48 The quo-
rum for these meetings is the majority of EDs repre-
senting at least one-half of the total voting power of this
IGO.49 The EDs choose the Bank’s President (Presi-
dent) for an extendable 5-year term,50 who chairs the
meetings of the BoDs51 and leads, at the same time, the
staff of the Bank.52 The staff under the responsibility of
the President carries out the Bank’s ordinary business.53
The President does not participate in the voting process
during the meetings of the BoDs unless votes are equal-
ly divided, in which case he has a deciding vote.54
Matters within each of the institutions of the Bank are
usually decided by a majority of votes cast.55 In certain
situations specified in their founding documents, they
may deviate from this general rule. However, the votes
are allocated within each institution of the Bank uneven-
ly owing to the difference in their membership. More-
over, the voting power in each institution is distributed
unequally among the members because of the ‘weighted
voting system’. This system is the survival of the com-
promise that resulted from the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence. At this conference, the representatives discussed
41. The excluded powers differ per institution. See Art. V (2[b]); Art. V
(4[b]); Art. VIII (a) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (2[c]) of Articles IDA.
42. Art. V (4[a]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (4[a]) of Articles IDA.
43. Id.
44. Since 1 November 2010, the number of EDs has increased to 25. See
<http:// worldbank. org/ en/ about/ leadership/ directors> (last visited 9
October 2017).
45. These countries are the United States, France, the United Kingdom,
Germany and Japan. See <http:// siteresources. worldbank. org/
ESSDNETWORK/ Resources/ 481106 -1129303936381/ 1777397
-1129303967165/ chapter1. html> (last visited 9 October 2017).
46. Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation and China choose their own repre-
sentatives. See S. Park, ‘The World Bank – Plus Ca Change? Comment’,
in A.T. Weller and X. Yi-chong (eds.), The Politics of IOs: Views from
Insiders (2015), at 87.
47. Art. VI (4[b]) of Articles IDA.
48. See <http:// siteresources. worldbank. org/ ESSDNETWORK/ Resources/
481106 -1129303936381/ 1777397 -1129303967165/ chapter1. html>
(last visited 9 October 2017).
49. Art. V (4[f]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (4) of Articles IDA.
50. Section 13(c) By-Laws of IBRD (As amended through 26 September
1980).
51. Art. V (5[a]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (5[a]) of Articles IDA.
52. Art. V (5[b]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (5[b]) of Articles IDA.
53. Id.
54. Art. V (5[a]) of Articles IBRD and Art. V (5[a]) of Articles IDA.
55. Art. V (10[b]) of Articles IBRD and Art. VI (3[b]) of Articles IDA. This
rule is nowadays considered to be of symbolic value as all matters with-
in the two institutions of the Bank are decided on consensus. However,
as Shihata noted, this rule is one of the factors that influence the cur-
rent decision-making process within the Bank. See I.F.I. Shihata, The
World Bank Legal Papers (2000), at 580.
two approaches for the determination of voting power of
each member state: one was based on the legal principle
of the equality of states, and the other on the actual con-
tributions or quotas.56 As a result, they agreed on a com-
bination of both the approaches, consisting of basic
votes and additional votes, depending on the number of
subscribed shares in the capital stock of that
institution.57 Nevertheless, these general approaches are
elaborated differently in each of the Articles of the
Bank’s institutions. Whereas the basic votes of an IBRD
member are determined by multiplying the aggregate
sum of the voting power of all members by 5.55%,58 the
basic vote of an original IDA member is a fixed amount
of 500.59 The same is true with regard to additional
votes. An IBRD member may acquire one additional
vote for each share of stock60 with a par value of
$100,000,61 while an original IDA member may acquire
one additional vote for each $5,000 of its initial sub-
scription.62 It should, however, be noted that the above
rules with regard to IDA’s votes do not apply to IDA’s
members that could not be seen as the ‘original member’
of this institution in accordance with Article II, Section
1, Subsection a of its Articles. According to Article V,
Section 3, Subsection a, Paragraph i of the IDAs Arti-
cles, the rules with regard to their voting rights are
determined by the BoGs. During the IDAs third
replenishment, the IDAs voting powers were realigned
with relative contributions of its members without mak-
ing a general adjustment in its Articles.63 The IBRD has
also revised its distribution of voting power several
times. However, these revisions led to adjustments of
the IBRD’s Articles. The last of such a revision took
place in 201064 but resulted only in a substantial increase
in the voting powers of a few large economies, with a
slight increase or even decrease in the voting powers of
other developing members.65
2.4 Finances
The IBRD has traits similar to a banking institution. Its
primary source of income is the international financial
market, to which it issues bonds and other debt securi-
ties.66 These financial papers are bought by various par-
56. A. Buira, ‘The Bretton Woods Institutions: Governance Without Legiti-
macy?’, in A. Buira (ed.), Reforming the Governance of the IMF and the
World Bank (2005) 2, at 9.
57. Id.
58. Art. V (10 [a(i)]) of Articles IBRD. Before 2012, this basic vote was fixed
and amounted to 250.
59. Art. VI [3(a)] of Articles IDA.
60. Art. V (3 [a(i)]) of Articles IBRD.
61. Art. II (2[a]) of Articles IBRD.
62. Art. VI (3[a]) of Articles IDA.
63. The BoGs had such a right based on Art VI (2 [c(ii)]) of the IDA’s Arti-
cles. See IDA 13 (2001), above n. 19, at 3-4.
64. Development Committee, ‘World Bank Group Voice Reform: Enhancing
Voice and Participation of Developing and Transition Countries in 2010
and Beyond’, DC2010-0006, 19 April 2010; and World Bank Group,
2015 Shareholding Review: Report to Governors, 10 October 2015
Development Committee meeting, DC2015-0007, 28 September 2015.
65. See id. and <http:// reuters. com/ article/ us -worldbank/ china -gains -clout
-in -world -bank -vote -shift -idUSTRE63O1RQ20100425> (last visited: 9
October 2017).
66. The World Bank, A Guide to the World Bank (2011), at 67.
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ties ranging from large public and private institutions to
individuals.67 Since the debt papers are guaranteed by
all members of this institution, they have a Triple-A
credit rating, and as such, the IBRD pays a low market
interest rate to its creditors. This minimum level of
costs for funding enables this institution to set lower
interest rates for its clients – with a small margin – than
the market interest rates that these members would have
received if they sold their own financial papers to the
international financial market.68 In addition to this low
interest rate, the IBRD offers its clients more flexible
terms for its lending instruments than the international
financial market.69
According to its Articles, the IBRD may also derive
income from subscriptions to its capital. Article II, Sec-
tion 5 in conjunction with Article II, Section 7, Para-
graph i of the Articles of IBRD stipulates that a country
that joins the Bank pay 2% of its subscription to the
IBRDs capital in gold or United States dollars. When-
ever IBRD needs a funding for its operations, it may
place a call on the 18% of the subscription, which could
be paid to this institution in the currency of that mem-
ber state.70 In case IBRD makes or facilitates loans
specified in Article IV, Section 1, Subsection a, Para-
graphs ii and iii Articles of IBRD, it may place a call on
the remaining 80% of the subscription that could be
made in gold or United States dollars or in any other
currency of the member’s choice.71 Until now, the
IBRD has never invoked these provisions with regard to
‘unpaid balance’ in its Articles, since the Bank has
always been able to pay its creditors back.72 Further-
more, its operating expenses have so far always been met
from its operational income deriving from the small
margin on its interest rates and interest income on its
equity.73 The net amount that remains each year – after
deduction of expenses – is used to fill up its reserves,
and the amount that is left is transferred to the IDA.74
Furthermore, the IBRD administers its own and donor
states’ trust funds.75
The finances of the IDA differ greatly from those of the
IBRD. Its main source of income consists of donations
from its 52 donor members.76 To these donors belong
not only ‘old’ wealthy economies – such as the United
States or France – but also ‘new’ ones, like the Russian
Federation, Brazil or Turkey.77 This funding is refilled
by the donors every 3 years.78 In addition, the IDA
derives its financial means from the contributions to its
67. Id.
68. Id., at 68.
69. For example, client states may choose a loan period for up to thirty
years, including grace period. See id., at 67.
70. Art. II (5[i]) in conjunction with Art. II (7[i]) of Articles IBRD.
71. Art. II (5[ii]) in conjunction with Art. II (7[i]) of Articles IBRD.
72. The World Bank (2011), above n. 66, at 68.
73. Id.
74. Art. V (14) of Articles IBRD.
75. The World Bank (2011), above n. 66, at 67.
76. Id., at 68.
77. Id.
78. Id.
capital by its members,79 and through repayments of
loan principal on its 20- to 40-year credits.80 Further-
more, the IDA receives funding from the IBRD81 and
IFC.82
2.5 Services
At the moment, the Bank serves its 144 members as its
clients.83 These services are provided in two different
fields: finance and knowledge.84 The Bank’s primary
operations or activities take place in the financial field.
However, it is not a commercial, but a cooperative insti-
tution that operates for the benefit of its members.85
Owing to that position and its mandate, the Bank’s
financial activities aim only at granting loans for devel-
opmental and reconstruction purposes to its members.
The IBRD grants a loan to public institutions of its cli-
ents for development projects at ‘preferential’ terms or
rates close to commercial rates.86 Private institutions
may also borrow from IBRD funds, provided that their
borrowing is guaranteed by a member. On the other
hand, IDA’s credits could be borrowed by low-income
members on so-called ‘concessional’ terms or very low
and sometimes zero-interest rates.87 The IDA also pro-
vides grants to its clients suffering from debt distress.88
Besides its credits and grants, IDA helps its clients with
the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative
and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI).89
The major eligibility test to borrow from IDA or IBRD
resources is determined by two factors: (a) relative pov-
erty; or (b) lack of creditworthiness for market-based
loans. Relative poverty is defined through calculation of
per capita gross national income (GNI)90 based on the
Bank’s Atlas method.91 If the GNI of that member is
below a certain level, which is determined each year,
then that member is eligible to borrow from IDA
funds.92 Some members, whose GNI lies above the
threshold but that do not meet the requirement for
creditworthiness are also allowed to borrow from this
institution.93 Some IDA eligible members, which are
creditworthy, may also borrow from certain IBRD
funds.94 These members are usually called blend bor-
79. Art. II (2) of Articles IDA.
80. The World Bank (2011), above n. 66, at 68.
81. Art. V (14) of Articles IBRD.
82. The World Bank (2011), above n. 66, at 68.
83. See <https:// datahelpdesk. worldbank. org/ knowledgebase/ articles/
906519 -world -bank -country -and -lending -groups> (last visited 9 Octo-
ber 2017).
84. World Bank Group (2016), above n. 25, at 141.
85. The World Bank (2011), above n. 66, at 68.
86. Garcia, above n. 20.




90. Formerly known as GNP.
91. See <https:// datahelpdesk. worldbank. org/ knowledgebase/ articles/
378832 -what -is -the -world -bank -atlas -method> (last visited 9 October
2017).
92. $1,165 in fiscal year 2018. See <http:// ida. worldbank. org/ about/
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rowers.95 At the moment, 69 are IBRD, 59 are IDA and
the remaining 16 members are blend borrowers.96
The Bank may provide, in accordance with its Articles,
its financing only for ‘specific projects’, except in ‘spe-
cial circumstances’.97 On the basis of these provisions,
the Bank has now three main financing instruments.
The most frequently used and oldest lending instru-
ment98 is Investment Project Financing (IPF),99 which
was formerly known as ‘investment loans’100 and
‘investment guarantees’. As of fiscal year 2015, around
70% of the Bank’s loans consisted of this type of loan.101
The operations financed with this lending instrument
have a duration of 5 to 10 years.102 The aim of this lend-
ing instrument is to provide financial means and related
operational support on the basis of various projects such
as goods, works and services within the framework of
economic and social development.103 The second largest
financing instrument is Development Policy Financing
(DPF),104 which takes a share of 29%.105 The Bank
replaced with this single and quick-disbursing lending
instrument all its policy-based or adjustment loans in
August 2004.106 It is used to restore the member’s bal-
ance of payments disequilibrium, and supports govern-
ment policy and institutional reforms such as tax
reform.107 The DPF attaches to the IBRD’s loans,
IDA’s credits and grants, as well as IBRD and IDA’s
guarantees, a condition or ‘conditionality’ encompassing
a policy reform and actions that should be implemented
by its borrowers.108 The last and – at the time moment –
the least used lending instrument is Program-for-
Results Financing (PfR). It was created in 2012 and
95. Id.
96. Id. See also <https:// datahelpdesk. worldbank. org/ knowledgebase/
articles/ 906519 -world -bank -country -and -lending -groups> (last visited
31 October 2017).
97. Art. II (4[vii]) IBRD Articles and Art. V (1[b]) IDA Articles.
98. World Bank, 2015 Development Policy Financing Retrospective (2014),
at 1.
99. On 25 October 2012, Bank’s BoDs approved a set of reforms that were
aimed at simplifying the project loans. These reforms took effect from 8
April 2013. The new policy replaced many policies and procedures on
project-based loans with a single policy called OP/BP 8.60 on Invest-
ment Project Financing.
100. These investment loans included Specific Investment Loan, Sector
Investment and Maintenance Loan, Adaptable Program Loan Learning
and Innovation Loan, Technical Assistance Loan, Financial Intermediary
Loan and Emergency Recovery Loans. See World Bank – Operations
Policy and Country Services, ‘Lending Instruments: Resources for Devel-
opment Impact’, (2001), at 5.
101. World Bank (2014), above n. 98, at 1.
102. World Bank Group (2016), above n. 25, at 52.
103. Id. See also OP 10.00.
104. DPF is governed by the operational policy approved by the Bank’s EDs
in August 2004 (OP 8.60).
105. World Bank (2014), above n. 98, at 1.
106. This change took place through OP 8.60. See Legal Vice Presidency –
World Bank, ‘Review of World Bank Conditionality: Legal Aspects of
Conditionality in Policy-Based Lending’, (2005), at 3.
107. The World Bank (2011), above n. 66, at 76.
108. Section III (4) of OP 8.60 of the Bank.
109. World Bank (2014), above n. 98, at 1.
accounts for 5%.109 It links ‘disbursements directly to
the delivery of defined results’.110
In addition to its lending operations, the Bank carries
out analytical and research work activities. These activi-
ties are performed usually in combination with its lend-
ing operations and sometimes on a stand-alone basis. In
the analytical field, the Bank has an instrument that is
called Advisory Services and Analytics (ASA).111 By
using this instrument it provides its clients ‘with cus-
tomized expertise and analytics, either as stand-alone
services or as a complement to financial support pro-
grams’.112 The ASA encompass Economic Sector Work
(ESW), Non-Lending Technical Assistance (TA) and
impact evaluation and training.113 Out of these instru-
ments the ESW is targeted to ‘influence policy choices
and programs’ through diagnostic and analytical
reports.114 It can be divided into three sub-activities,
namely core diagnostic work (CDW), sector and the-
matic studies (STS) and other ESW. The CDW is per-
formed prior to and in support of its lending pro-
grammes.115 The STS, as well as the other ESW, are
aimed at influencing programmes and policies in client
countries. Moreover, the reports concluding these stud-
ies contain officially endorsed recommendations by the
Bank and express the formal position held by the Bank
units that performed the study.116 On the other hand,
the Non-Lending TA is utilised for ‘building capacities
and strengthening institutions through events and
reports’.117 The Bank funds its stand-alone non-lending
operations with either its own financial means or donor-
provided trust funds and resources or funds provided
by its clients themselves. The research work activities
are carried out by the Bank itself or performed on com-
mission by other parties.
All these loans and assistance in the field of knowledge
are usually provided within the framework of compre-
hensive lending programmes laid down in its Country
Assistance Strategy paper. This paper is the result of a
periodic negotiation between the Bank and the borrow-
ing member state and contains the main points of the
Bank’s assistance to its clients, reflecting local circum-
stances and needs.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The Bank is a multilaterally established financial IGO
active in the developmental field. At its creation, it was
largely a Western organisation both in its operational
field and in membership, but today its operations focus
entirely on developing states, and more than the majori-
ty of its members belong to these states. Nevertheless,
110. IMF, OECD, UN and WBG, ‘Enhancing the Effectiveness of External






115. See <https:// openknowledge. worldbank. org/ handle/ 10986/ 6> (last
visited 9 October 2017).
116. Id.
117. IMF et al. (July 2016), above n. 110, at 44.
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the decision-making power within this IGO remained,
owing to its weighted voting system, in the hands of its
wealthy shareholders located in the West – with the
notable exception of some high-income developing
states that are politically and economically important.
3 On the Bank’s Activities in
the Tax Field
3.1 Introductory Remarks
In Section 2.5, I gave an overview of the services that
the Bank provides to its client member states. This sec-
tion aims to elaborate on that matter by focusing on the
tax-related activities of the Bank. As these activities
derive from two related informal decisions of the Bank
to expand its activities into the domestic and interna-
tional tax fields, I will depict these activities separately
in the following two subsections.
3.2 Activities after Expansion into the Domestic
Tax Field
Domestic tax issues of its developing members became a
concern of the Bank from the 1970s onwards.118 During
that incipient period, the Bank’s tax related advice
mostly focused ona particular sector in its client’s econ-
omy.119 A little attention – if any – was paid to the gen-
eral tax structure.120 Whenever it formed a part of the
advice it was only about raising the taxes.121 The tax
administration seemed to be an issue that was not worth
considering.122
In the late 1970s, the Bank’s many developing members
were hit by severe balance of payments problems.123
Since the efforts of the formal legal transplantations
under the Law and Development movement had not
resulted in the desired outcomes,124 the Bank decided to
pursue a new strategy based on a neoliberal economic
model.125 The conviction for this macroeconomic strat-
egy came from the Bank’s study conducted in Sub-
Saharan Africa that presented bad domestic policies to
be the cause of failed efforts to yield economic develop-
ment and advised replacement of these policies with
market-oriented ones as a strategy that would lead to
more economic growth.126 So from 1980,127 the Bank
began – based on the ‘special circumstances’ provision
in Article I, Section iii of IBRD’s Articles and Article I
118. Z. Shalizi, Lessons of Tax Reform (1991), at 8.
119. Id., at 7-8.
120. Id.
121. Id., at 8.
122. Id.
123. I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays –
Volume I (1991), at 58.
124. T. Kever, ‘The Legal Turn in Late Development Theory: The Rule of Law
and the World Bank’s Development Model’, 1 Harvard International
Law Journal 287, at 296 (2011).
125. S. Park and A. Vetterlein, ‘Introduction’, in S. Park and A. Vetterlein
(eds.), Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and
the World Bank (2010), at 9.
126. Kever, above n. 124, at 297.
127. Shihata (1991), above n. 123, at 58.
of IDA’s Articles – to provide non-project loans.128
These loans were accompanied by conditions or ‘condi-
tionalities’ that required the borrower to implement ‘a
program of reforms and actions’.129 These reforms and
actions had to be in line with the aforementioned neolib-
eral economic policies,130 which are usually mistakenly
called ‘Washington Consensus’ policies.131
The introduction of this neoliberal strategy was accom-
panied by the expansion and intensification of tax advi-
sory and analytical activities in the existing tax work
field.132 Nevertheless, the Bank organised and discussed
general tax policy issues during its meetings with clients
based on the analysis and recommendations given by
other IGOs,133 such as the IMF or the United States
Agency for International Development. Moreover, the
Bank took part in some tax missions that were organised
by the IMF to review the existing conditions and devise
new policies. In the mid-1980s, the Bank’s working
method changed as a result of a significant increase in
requests from its clients for TA and policy advice on tax
issues.134 Empowered by the initial activities and
requests from its clients, the Bank embarked on its own
mission to reform the tax systems of its developing
members. For that purpose, it produced ‘detailed
reports and recommendations’ and independently
carried out negotiations with its clients to reflect these
recommendations in its adjustment lending pro-
grammes.135 However, as a result of several incidents
and the Asian financial crisis in 1997, it began to closely
coordinate its policy-based loans with the IMF.136
In the beginning, only tax policy issues were reflected in
the Bank’s adjustment loans with tax-related condition-
ality. The conditionality in these loans was primarily
directed at ‘generating revenue to stabilize the econo-
my’.137 Later on, it began to include ‘broader policies of
encouraging more efficient allocation in private produc-
tion and investment’ and ‘greater attention to equity’.138
Notwithstanding this shift in its focus, the tax policy
conditions were always in line with ‘the prevailing best
practices’ of that period.139 Gradually, the Bank realised
that the implementation of its tax policy reforms also
depended on ‘the implementation capacity of govern-
ments and their commitments to reform’ in developing
members.140 As a result, the Bank’s conditionality was
128. Id., at 63-4 and Legal Vice Presidency – World Bank (2005), above n.
106, at iv.
129. Legal Vice Presidency – World Bank (2005), above n. 106, at iv.
130. Shihata (1991), above n. 123, 63-4. Also see Park and Vetterlein, above
n. 125, at 10 (fn. 3).
131. J. Williamson, ‘What Should the World Bank Think about the Washing-
ton Consensus?’, 2 The World Bank Research Observer 251, at 251
(2000).




136. The Secretary of the U.S. Treasury, ‘IMF and World Bank collaboration
and IMF Accountability’, (2009), at 2-3.
137. Shalizi (1991), above n. 118, at 9.
138. Id., at 9-10.
139. Id., at 8.
140. Shihata (1991), above n. 123, at 59.
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expanded to include ‘institutional changes in macroeco-
nomic and financial management, sectoral restructuring
and policy reforms, enhancement of public sector effi-
ciency and constraints in public sector management’.141
In the tax field, it meant the implementation of tax
administration reforms,142 which concerned organisa-
tional and functional reforms.143 From 1987, tax admin-
istration reforms were increased in volume and with that
became a significant part of the Bank’s work in the tax
field.144 Nevertheless, as Zmarak Shalizi noted, the
overall involvement of the Bank in reforming tax sys-
tems of its developing members was always restricted to
partial reform programmes and did not include all-
embracing major tax policy and tax administration
reforms.145
3.3 Activities after Expansion into the
International Tax Field
The Bank has focused until recently only on domestic
tax issues of its developing members. However, the out-
break of the 2008 global financial and economic crisis
reduced domestic public revenues even in high-income
developed economies. This fact, combined with the sub-
sequent exposure of the extensive aggressive tax plan-
ning practices for MNEs and HNWIs, enhanced the
G20’s attention on public resources. Starting with its
high-level meeting in 2010, the G20 has consequently
issued several requests to four major IGOs – the Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), IMF, WBG and United Nations (UN) –
active inter alia in the field of taxation. The first of these
requests was made during the G20’s Seoul Summit.146
As a follow-up to this request, the four IGOs brought
out a report in 2011 that threw light on ongoing work of
all four IGOs that aim at tax capacity building in devel-
oping states.147 The next request from the G20 Devel-
opment Working Group came in the first half of 2015.
In the build-up to the 10th meeting of the G20 heads of
government and heads of state, it requested the four
IGOs to investigate options for low-income countries’
effective and efficient use of tax incentives for invest-
ment, which is considered to be one of the main causes
of tax competition in developing states.148 Again, the
four IGOs responded to this request with a presentation
of their joint report,149 which was discussed during the
141. Id.
142. J. Datta-Mitra, Fiscal Management in Adjustment Lending: A World
Bank Operations Evaluation Study (1997), at 72.
143. Shalizi (1991), above n. 118, at 10.
144. Datta-Mitra (1997), above n. 142, at 72.
145. Shalizi (1991), above n. 118, at 45.
146. IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, ‘Supporting the Development of
More Effective Tax Systems: A Report to the G-20 Development Work-
ing Group’, (2011), at 10.
147. Id.
148. IMF, OECD, UN, and World Bank, ‘Options for Low Income Countries’
Effective and Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment’, (2015), at
6.
149. The report has a title ‘Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and
Efficient Use of Tax Incentives for Investment.’ It was presented to the
G20 Development Working Group in September 2015. See id., at 2.
G20 Antalya summit.150 This request was, however, not
the last one, and several other requests followed after-
wards.
In the meantime, in preparation for the third Interna-
tional Conference on Financing for Development, the
six major international and regional development banks,
along with the IMF, presented a joint discussion note to
the 18 April 2015 Development Committee meeting of
the Bank and IMF.151 This note, called ‘From Billions
to Trillions: Transforming Development Finance’,
offered a new approach to financing for development,
which emphasised the need for strengthening domestic
public resources of developing states and the role that
the multilateral development banks, as well as the IMF,
should play in this process.152 This approach was subse-
quently adopted in the ‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda’.153
Shortly after, during the UN Sustainable Development
Summit, held in New York from 25 to 27 September
2015, the international community adopted a declara-
tion with a new set of Sustainable Development
Goals,154 which replaced Millennium Development
Goals.155 In paragraph 41 of this declaration, the UN
General Assembly recognised that ‘each country has
primary responsibility for its own economic and social
development’ and that ‘implementation of the Goals and
targets’ will need inter alia ‘the mobilization of financial
resources as well as capacity-building’. Furthermore, it
stated therein that public finances will play a pivotal role
in that process. This and other statements of the decla-
ration show that the Addis Ababa Action Agenda forms
an integral part of this declaration. As a result, strength-
ening tax systems – both tax policy and tax administra-
tion – became one of the main global development pri-
orities.156
In light of these developments on the international
political arena, it became necessary for the Bank to make
international tax issues another component of its work.
Accordingly, a Global Tax Team was created within the
Bank’s Governance Global Practice as a departmental
unit, which is responsible for coordination of the Bank’s
international tax-related work, in the first quarter of
2016.157 Its main mandate, according to the information
placed on the Bank’s website, is the design of ‘struc-
150. The 10th annual meeting of the G20 heads of government and heads
of state, organized in Antalya, Turkey, from 15 to 16 November 2015.
151. Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and
the IMF on the Transfer of Real Resources.
152. See <http:// www5. worldbank. org/ mdgs/ post2015. html> (last visited 9
October 2017).
153. The ‘Addis Ababa Action Agenda’ of the Third International Conference
on Financing for Development, adopted by the General Assembly on 27
July 2015 (resolution 69/313, annex).
154. This declaration is titled ‘Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development’ and adopted by the General Assembly on 25
September 2015 (resolution A/RES/70/1).
155. These goals are to be found in the ‘UN Millennium Declaration’, which
was adopted by the General Assembly on 8 September 2000 (resolution
55/2).
156. IMF, OECD, UN and World Bank, ‘Concept Note: The Platform for Col-
laboration on Tax’, (April 2016), at 3.
157. See <www. worldbank. org/ en/ topic/ governance/ overview#2> (last vis-
ited 9 October 2017).
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tured guidance on tax policy and administration reform
and to ensure that the global discussion around interna-
tional tax issues acknowledges the circumstances of
developing countries and serves to advance the Bank
Group’s twin goals’.158 This meant in practice that the
Bank supports its clients with the design and implemen-
tation of instruments and administrative procedures to
address key sources of base erosion, which includes
transfer mispricing, tax treaty application issues, detect-
ing and adjudicating aggressive tax planning structures
and other methods of profit shifting, and tax transpar-
ency through exchange of information.159
In addition to the creation of the Global Tax Team, the
Bank decided, together with its partner IGOs, to
enhance its cooperation in the tax field. Consequently,
they created a Platform for Collaboration on Tax (Plat-
form) in April 2016.160 This Platform, however, did not
create a new formal IGO as its members stay independ-
ent from each other in carrying out their own mandated
activities.161 As its founding document ‘Concept Note’
stated, the Platform was created owing to a rise of com-
mon challenges that derive from the ‘increased linkages
between economies and progress in reform’.162 Further-
more, it noted that the main purpose of this Platform is
to intensify tax-related cooperation between these main
IGOs in order to ‘better support governments in
addressing the tax challenges they face’.163 To these
supporting activities belong the issuance of joint outputs
on both domestic and international tax issues, the
exchange information on their respective operational
and knowledge activities,164 and the coordination of
their activities that should link the standard setting to
capacity building and TA.165 In reality, the last task
implied implementation of the results of the OECD/
G-20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project166 and
effectuation of the Global Standard for Transparency
and Effective Exchange of Information167 in developing
members.168 Within the framework of this informal net-
work, the committed IGOs also aim to continue on a
regular basis the already existing discussions on ‘the
design and implementation of standards for internation-
al tax matters’.169 Moreover, they wish to organise high-
level as well as technical-level meetings to discuss tax
issues170 and to support developing states with their par-
158. Id.
159. IMF et al. (July 2016), n. 110, at 45.
160. IMF et al. (April 2016), above n. 156, at 3.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id., at 5.
164. IMF Press Release No. 16/176, 19 April 2016.
165. IMF et al. (April 2016), above n. 156, at 5.
166. This project aims to counter tax avoidance strategies of MNEs.
167. The standard was developed within the framework of the Global Forum
on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes.
168. IMF et al. (April 2016), above n. 156, at 8-9.
169. Id., at 3.
170. Id., at 6 and 10.
ticipation in the future global standard setting
process.171
After this second expansion, the Bank’s work in the tax
field is now mostly aimed at building the capacity of the
tax systems of its clients.172 This capacity building work
is focused on both domestic tax related issues (domestic
tax policy and administration) and international tax rela-
ted issues.173 In relation to domestic tax policy, various
tax reform programmes have been devised so far.174
These reforms range from comprehensive reforms to
reforms restricted to a certain part of the tax system,
such as tax incentives. The reforms are subsequently
implemented and sustained in practice through domes-
tic tax legislation, judicial work and operations of the tax
administration. Whereas tax legislation forms a part of
the overall tax reform programmes, judicial reforms
have been receiving due attention from the Bank as a
part of its rule of law programmes.175 In contrast to
them, tax administration reforms have always formed a
distinct part of the Bank’s overall work in the tax field.
In the field of international taxation, the Bank assist
developing members with the design and implementa-
tion of instruments and administrative procedures for
effectuation of international standards.176
In order to carry out these tax-related activities, the
Bank has been using various lending and non-lending
instruments that are available to it. These instruments
are combined in such a way that it provides support to
client states ‘from diagnosis to analysis of causes ad sol-
utions of tax issues, design of a program of capacity
building, implementation, and, finally, evaluation.’177
The most relevant ones among them are now, without
doubt, the Bank’s lending instruments: the IPF, DPF
and PfR.178 The IPF is used for ‘building physical and
social infrastructure, such as Information Management
Information Systems and business process re-engineer-
ing for tax administrations’, whereas the DPF is
employed ‘for a program of policy and institutional
actions, such as changes in tax laws and arrangements
for providing tax incentives to foreign investors’.179
Compared with IPF and DPF, the PfR is used to ach-
ieve predefined results in taxation.180 In addition to
these main lending instruments, the Bank conducts pre-
paratory studies about a tax system prior to carrying out
its tax reforms known as ESW, which are usually fun-
ded by the Bank’s own budget. Furthermore, it carries
out various tax-related researches and assists in drafting
of tax legislation. These activities are mostly financed by
171. Id., at 8. Until today, no steps have been undertaken on the interna-
tional level that give a true participating right to developing states in
such process, so the intention of this network to support them in this
process is doubtful.
172. IMF et al. (July 2016), n. 110, at 44.
173. Id., at 44-45.
174. Id., at 45.
175. Shihata (1995), above n. 16, at 127-32.
176. IMF et al. (July 2016), n. 110, at 45.
177. Id., at 44.
178. See for these lending instruments in Section 2.5.
179. IMF et al. (July 2016), n. 110, at 44.
180. Id.
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the Bank’s Institutional Development Fund and other
ad hoc funds.181
3.4 Concluding Remarks
As early as the 1970s, the Bank made an informal deci-
sion to expand its activities into the domestic tax field of
its developing members. Initially, the Bank’s work was
focused on non-lending tax-related activities, which
encompassed analytical and advisory work. But gradual-
ly, the scope of the Bank’s work expanded to include tax
policy and tax administration reforms. These reforms
have been carried out first through the Bank’s adjust-
ment loans and later through the DPF. After the out-
break of the global economic and financial crisis in 2008,
the Bank had to shift its attention to international tax
issues owing to enhanced attention of the G20 on public
revenue. As a result, the Bank participates nowadays not
only in the creation of tax policy norms on the global




This section aims to give an answer to each of the two
questions posed in the introduction of this article. The
first question is about the legality of the Bank’s informal
decisions to expand into the domestic and international
tax fields. This issue will be addressed in Section 4.2.
The second question concerns the possible implications
of these two decisions for the Bank’s legitimacy. That
issue will be explored in Section 4.3.
4.2 On Legality of the Decisions to Expand
The Bank’s mandates are laid down in Article I of both
IBRD and IDA’s Articles. Neither this long list of man-
dates nor any other parts of the Bank’s founding docu-
ments contain any explicit reference to taxation. Yet this
lack of black letters cannot immediately be seen as a
legal impediment for expansion of the Bank’s activities
into the tax field. For the Bank’s Articles are intention-
ally defined as broadly and vaguely as possible, similar
to the case with any other mandates of any IGOs. More-
over, ambiguity is an inherent quality of every
language.182 As a result of that the meaning of a word or
text is rarely clear and always contingent on a context.
This nature of a language, therefore, makes interpreta-
tion a necessary part of a lawyer’s work. The tools or
methods of interpretation at the disposal of lawyers are,
however, limited in number. Besides that it cannot be
applied in an arbitrary way. For that purpose, Articles
31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties183 contain a set of rules that determine how
181. Shihata (1995), above n. 16, at 134-35.
182. J.E. Alvarez, ‘Constitutional Interpretation in international organiza-
tions’, in J. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of Interna-
tional Organizations (2001) 104, at 116.
183. UN DOC.A/CONF. 39/11/Add.2.
these interpretation methods should be applied in rela-
tion to treaties or agreements between states.
According to Article 31(1) of this convention, ‘A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning (emphasis added) to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its
object and purpose.’ Under the context mentioned in
this provision, the convention subsumes not only pre-
amble, text and annexes of that particular treaty, but
also other related agreements and instruments to that
treaty.184 In addition to the context, the convention
implors to pay attention to: ‘(a) any subsequent agree-
ment between the parties regarding the interpretation of
the treaty or the application of its provisions; (c) any
subsequent practice in the application of the treaty
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation; or (c) any relevant rules of interna-
tional law application in the relations between the par-
ties’.185 Furthermore, an interpreter should respect a
‘special meaning’ of a certain term provided that it is
demonstrated by the intention of the parties
concerned.186 These general rules of interpretation
could be, nonetheless, supplemented by other methods
of interpretation in order: (1) to validate the meaning
determined through the application of the general rules
of interpretation; or (2) to determine a different mean-
ing in case the meaning already found through the
application of the general rules of interpretation is
‘ambiguous’ or ‘absurd’, or leads to a result ‘manifestly
absurd’ or ‘unreasonable’.187
These rules of interpretation of a treaty lead to many
uncertainties in practice.188 The only clear rule that fol-
lows from them is the rule of hierarchy that says that a
‘textual’ or linguistic interpretation method189 should be
preferred over other interpretation methods.190 For the
textual interpretation, however, we need to pay due
attention to the context of the terms used (‘contextual’
or linguistic interpretation in the context involved)191
and also take into account the object and purpose of the
treaty or organisation (‘teleological’ or purposive inter-
pretation).192 Moreover, the subsequent practice – in
the case of an organisation it means especially the exer-
cise of ‘implied powers’193 – should play a role during
this endeavour. The ‘subjective’ or intentionist interpre-
tation method194 could also be applied – but only as a
last ‘resort’195 – when the foregoing methods do not lead
to reasonable results or when a special meaning of the
184. Art. 31(2) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
185. Art. 31(3) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
186. Art. 31(4) of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
187. Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
188. Alvarez (2001), above n. 182, at 116.
189. I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World – Volume III
(2000), at 6.
190. Alvarez (2001), above n. 182, at 116.
191. Shihata (2000), above n. 189, at 6.
192. Id.
193. Id., at 15. For implied powers see n. 238.
194. Id., 6.
195. Alvarez (2001), above n. 182, at 116 and Shihata (2000), above n. 189,
at 15.
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words was intended. As Jose E. Alvarez noted, the
wording of the provisions contains further vague terms
such as ‘in good faith’ and ‘ordinary meaning’, which
ask in their turn for the application of ‘canons of inter-
pretation’ that leave substantial discretionary space to
the interpreter.196 This leads to the conclusion that any
endeavours of interpretation will depend much on the
interpreter who is authorised to do that work.197 But
who is the authoritative interpreter in the case of the
Bank’s articles?
According to the Bank’s founding documents, the
Bank’s EDs are authorised to decide on issues concern-
ing disagreements with regard to interpretation of the
Bank’s articles.198 This decision can be appealed before
the BoGs, which is designated as a competent authority
to review the decisions of the EDs.199 As is clear from
these provisions of the Bank’s Articles, these organs
appear on stage only in exceptional situations when dis-
agreements arise regarding the interpretation of the arti-
cles. This suggests that someone other than these two
organs takes the initial decision for interpretation in the
day-to-day practice of the Bank. According to the San
Francisco decision given with regard to the interpreta-
tion of the UN Charter, issues of interpretation are left
to each institutional organ of the United Nations.200
This decision has attained widespread acceptance and is
considered to be applicable to other IGOs.201 Conse-
quently, each element of an organisation, including its
members, is eligible for that task.202 Since the question
of expansion of the Bank’s activities belongs to the
operational field of the Bank, the Bank’s internal organs
that decide on or approve its policies and operations
would likely be the designated instances to make such
interpretations. And in the case of the Bank, these
organs that decide on or approve the Bank’s policies and
operations are the BoDs and ultimately the BoGs.203
These are one and the same bodies entitled to interpret
the Bank’s Articles or review the Bank’s policies and
operations. In light of these rules, it is understandable
that the Bank’s EDs nowadays incorporate their inter-
pretations in their policy papers.204 Although a member
state has, in principle, the right to contest initial inter-
pretation, the conflation of two roles – determination of
policies and operations in line with the Articles and
interpretation of those articles – makes in advance the
possibility to contest such an initial interpretation need-
196. Alvarez (2001), above n. 182, at 116.
197. Id.
198. Art. IX (a) of Articles IBRD and Art. X (a) of Articles IDA.
199. Art. IX (b) of Articles IBRD and Art. X (b) of Articles IDA. Up to the
present moment, none of the Bank’s members has done such a request
for review. See Shihata (2000), above n. 189, at 16.
200. During the drafting process of the UN Charter, the drafters of this
instrument assigned a subcommittee to decide on the issue of interpre-
tation. This subcommittee produced a report that was adopted by both
the Committee on Legal Problems and Conference. See Alvarez (2001),
above n. 182, at 111-2.
201. Id., at 112.
202. Id.
203. Art. V (4[a]) IBRD Articles and art. VI (4[a]) IDA Articles.
204. Shihata (2000), above n. 189, at 6 and Shihata (1991), above n. 123, at
68.
less. Even if we can imagine that such a possibility
exists, then, as Alvarez noted, ‘members may not con-
test institutional practices’ owing to ‘lack of transparen-
cy, absence of financial or other resources to mount a
challenge, or simply fear of giving offence to powerful
members or organs’.205 Moreover, the resistance of
some members might be seen in practice as invalid since
there is no agreement as to what should be reckoned as
‘opposition’ and whether or not it was or should be seen
as timely filed.206 But we know that as long as the initial
interpretations are not contested by a member state,
they are presumed to be ‘legal’. For an ‘unchallenged
institutional practice’ resembles tacit consent207 and
even constitutes ‘precedents’ for future reference.208 In
these circumstances, the only comfort could be, there-
fore, found in the involvement of the legal opinion
issued by the Bank’s General Counsel in this BoDs’
interpretation process, which became a practice since
the establishment of the IBRD.209 Thanks to this infor-
mal process, the BoDs’ interpretations reflected in their
policy papers contain to a certain extent the legal ration-
ale that confines totally arbitrary interpretations.210
As was mentioned earlier in this article, the IBRD’s
main mandate is to assist in reconstruction and develop-
ment of its members by facilitating and financing invest-
ment for productive purposes. In addition to this, the
IBRD pursues other goals such as promotion of long-
range balanced growth of international trade and main-
tenance of equilibrium in the balance of payments by
encouraging international investment for the develop-
ment of productive resources of members. According to
the Bank’s former Senior Vice President and General
Counselor, Ibrahim Shihata, these ‘purposes’ of the
IBRD define two ‘statutory roles’ of the Bank: ‘that of a
facilitator and promoter of investment of capital, espe-
cially private foreign investment, for reconstruction and
productive purposes in member states’; and (b) ‘that of a
financier, i.e. a guarantor of/or a participant in “loans
and other investments” made by private foreign investors
and a direct lender of funds to finance or facilitate pro-
ductive purposes on suitable conditions “when private
capital is not available on reasonable terms.”’211 As Shi-
hata further noted, the first of these two roles has been
empowering the Bank ‘to address the conditions that
attract investment and the enabling environment needed
for economic growth and development’.212 This role was
the fertile ground for many expansions of the Bank’s
activities.213 It therefore seems to me plausible to con-
clude from it that the two successive expansions into the
tax field were also rooted in this role. Even more nota-
bly, tax measures are related to increase in private for-
205. Alvarez (2001), above n. 182, at 120.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id., at 112.
209. Shihata (2000), above n. 189, at 16-7.
210. Shihata (1991), above n. 123, at 68.
211. Shihata (2000), above n. 189, at 75.
212. Id.
213. Id., at 76.
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eign investment owing to their ability to affect invest-
ment decisions by creating an enabling environment
that promotes investments. Moreover, taxes are needed
for financing public expenditures. Under these public
expenditures, one might also include public investments
for productive purposes. Although the Bank aims pri-
marily at promotion of private investments, its mandate
does not prevent it from promoting public investments
for productive purposes as well. So paying attention to
taxation can lead to an increase in both private and pub-
lic investments for productive purposes. In this way, tax
issues fall clearly under the mandate of the Bank. The
same is true with regard to the IDA’s mandates, as taxa-
tion is one of the possible measures that indirectly or
directly could promote economic development, increase
productivity and thus raise standards of living in the less
developed areas of the world.
Nonetheless, the Bank’s founding documents contain
three other provisions, which make the above conclu-
sion doubtful. These provisions preclude the Bank
undertaking any activities that fall within the prohibited
political intervention. They are applicable to all deci-
sions of the Bank214 and could be found in Article III,
Section 5 (b); Article IV, Section 10; and Article V, Sec-
tion 5 (c) of the IBRD Articles and Article V, Section 1
(g); Article V, Section 6; and Article VI, Section 5 (c) of
the IDA Articles. The prohibitions define – according
to Shihata – the six distinct yet intertwined conditions
for the Bank’s operations.215 The two rules out of these
requirements are of particular importance in our case.
The first one refers to prohibition of interference in the
political affairs of a member, whereas the second one
prohibits taking non-economic considerations into
account during decision-making.216 Tax issues are high-
ly political in nature because they require, first of all,
answering questions, such as who and to what extent
should contribute to that particular country’s public
finance, that affect the distribution of wealth within a
society. Any activities undertaken in the field of taxation
could therefore be an activity prohibited by the Bank’s
own Articles owing to this general nature of tax issues.
And since the Bank has the duty to act in conformity
with its Articles, neglecting these prohibitions would
imply ‘for the Bank acting ‘ultra vires’ or beyond its
legal powers.217 The Bank’s former General Counsel
and his successive colleagues of the Legal Vice Presi-
dency seem to have always been conscious of such con-
sequence and advised to approach such issues with due
caution.218 However, they did not completely deny the
possibility of involvement of the Bank in activities that
are related to political issues.219 Although I agree with
their latter opinion, I think that it is possible to make a
clear distinction between the allowed and not allowed
214. Shihata (1991), above n. 123, at 65-6.
215. Id., at 66-7.
216. Art. III (5[b]) and Art. IV (10) of IBRD Articles. Also Art. V (1[g]) and
Art. V (6) of IDA Articles.
217. Shihata (1991), above n. 123, at 66-7.
218. Legal Vice Presidency – World Bank (2005), above n. 106, at 17.
219. Id., 16-7.
involvements of the Bank in a tax-related activity. In my
opinion, such a distinction could be made not on the
basis of the nature of the issues concerned, but on that
of the degree and nature of the involvement. For exam-
ple, a tax-related conditionality in a lending instrument
will be problematic if it concerns a pre-selected choice
that should be implemented by the client, while an advi-
sory activity that discusses technical issues of taxation
should not be seen as a prohibited activity. Anyway,
since the constituent organs of the Bank carrying out its
mandates are allowed to interpret the mandates them-
selves, it is possible that they have concluded based on
this flawed provision in the Articles that these kinds of
activities do not fall under the prohibited political activ-
ity. And since no cases of objection by members – not-
withstanding the question whether or not they had an
opportunity to do so – are known, the Bank could, oddly
enough, rightfully assume that its decisions to expand
were legal – all the more notably as other decisions to
expand into the non-tax fields that were taken earlier
within the Bank could also act as ‘precedents’ for the
Bank’s expansions into the tax field. This leads, there-
fore, to the conclusion that both the decisions of the
Bank to expand were legal. In the following section, I
provide an answer to the second question that was posed
in the introduction of this article.
4.3 Implications for the Bank’s Legitimacy
According to Martti Koskenniemi, legitimacy is a notion
of recent vintage that was developed by liberal political
theory in order ‘to enable criticism of social institutions
without relying on earlier routes of critical thought
which had been traveled to the end and in the process
had lost much of their respectability’.220 Whatever pur-
pose the creators of this notion had for it, it has now
become one of the most widely used concepts with an
application and utility beyond the realm of this theory.
However, the meaning of this concept is vague, and
consequently it is normatively defined in several differ-
ent ways. In legal or political literature, the most widely
accepted meaning is the reason why someone follows a
rule. This meaning is, however, too broad without fur-
ther clarifications as there are other factors that can
yield rule-following or compliance with a rule.221 In
addition to legitimacy, one comes across in the literature
three other factors of compliance with a rule, which are
self-interest, coercion and rational persuasion. From all
these means of compliance, the legitimacy appears to
have a quality that creates voluntary compliance with a
rule in the absence of these three alternative sources of
compliance. But the question could be raised as to why
anyone without being obliged to or being rationally per-
suaded oreven having a self-interest in the outcome
would simply follow a rule. Whereas it is clear to every-
220. M. Koskenniemi, ‘Book Reviews and Notes’, American Journal of Inter-
national Law 86, at 175 (1992).
221. D. Bodansky, ‘The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming
Challenge for International Environmental Law’, 93 American Journal of
International Law 596, at 602-3 (1999). Franck does not say that with
much wording. Buchanan and Keohane do the same.
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one that other three bases of compliance can induce
compliant behaviour, more is needed to understand
what legitimacy is.
Daniel Bodansky and Rudiger Wolfrum observed in this
regard that legitimacy is not exclusively a ‘reason’ for
compliance, but also a ‘justification’ of the exercise of
(any kind of) authority.222 Yet this observation does not
seem to convey that legitimacy and justification are
coextensive. Such an observation would be, otherwise,
narrow as it, on the one hand, would neglect the differ-
ence between the meanings of these two concepts and,
on the other hand, would suppose one-sided action from
the ‘governor’ to the ‘governed’223 to substantiate its
claim for authority. Monica Hlavac warned, therefore,
rightfully of this kind of ‘Kantian tendency’ based on
the A. John Simmons’s conclusion that legitimacy judg-
ment differs from the justification judgment.224 Sim-
mons mentioned two reasons for it. First, a person
would require more than a justification before he
accepts restrictions on his natural freedom. Second, a
justification does not in itself impose obligations on peo-
ple. Consequently, Hlavac notes that legitimacy derives
from a two-way significant relationship between the one
that make decisions and the ones that are affected by its
decision.225 However, this proposition of Hlavac is not
completely new as any normative theory on legitimacy
assumes some kind of relationship between the agent
and its principal. The agent is in this case always the one
who has the right to govern or rule, whereas the princi-
pal differs in each theory – being the god, sovereign
states, constituencies or affected people.
We are, however, not readily equipped with the above to
assess the legitimacy of any international institution or
its output as they only draw the outer lines of the notion
of legitimacy. Consequently, it is imperative to do more
exploration to find out when exactly we can speak of
legitimacy or what the possible yardstick – sometimes
called ‘sources’,226 ‘variables’,227 ‘elements’228 or ‘stand-
ards’229 – of legitimacy is. Many different yardsticks for
legitimacy are mentioned by various scholars belonging
to many different traditions of international legal and
international relations scholarships. They are usually
categorised as source-, procedure- and outcome-based
222. D. Bodansky, ‘The Concept of Legitimacy in International Law’, in R.
Wolfrum & V. Roben (eds.), Legitimacy in International Law (2008)
309, at 312; Bodanksy (1999), above n. 221, at 603; and R. Wolfrum,
‘Legitimacy of International Law from a Legal Perspective: Some Intro-
ductory Considerations’, in R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.), Legitimacy
in International Law (2008) 1, at 6.
223. I borrow these terms from Brunnée and Toope. See J. Brunnée and S.J.
Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interac-
tional Theory of International Law’, 39 Columbia Journal of Transna-
tional Law 19 (2000).
224. M. Hlavac, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Legitimacy of Global
Governance Institutions’, in D.A. Reidy and W.J. Riker (eds.), Coercion
and the State (2008) 203, at 212-3.
225. Id., at 212-4.
226. Id., at 204.
227. Brunnée and Toope (2000), above n. 223, at 53.
228. Wolfrum (2008), above n. 222, at 6.
229. A. Buchanan and R.O. Keohane, ‘The Legitimacy of Global Governance
Institutions’, in R. Wolfrum and V. Roben (eds.), Legitimacy in Interna-
tional Law (2008) 25, at 28.
ones.230 In what follows, I explore some of the most
authoritative theories forwarded within international
law and international relations scholarships.
Pursuant to the dominant theoretical tradition of inter-
national legal scholarship, states legitimise activities of
IIs by giving their consent to their activities. In relation
to multilaterally established IGOs, this consent is given
by the states either, at the onset, through signing of a
treaty establishing an IGO or, later, through accessing
to the membership of that IGO.231 The state consent
has such a legitimising effect as, on the one hand, states
have a ‘thick’ legitimacy on the national level232 and, on
the other hand, they are the only – for the most part233 –
players in the international arena. This arena is horizon-
tal in nature234 and distinct from the national playfield
owing to its lack of Austinian power.235 Consequently,
state consent is the only standard of legitimacy at the
international level. All the traditional sources of interna-
tional law236 – (internationally recognised) general prin-
ciples of law, treaties and international customary law –
can therefore be led directly or indirectly to state con-
sent.237 Even the extensive decision-making power of
IGOs also finds its origin in the consent of states.238
This consent not only has a legitimising effect for the
rules of international law, but also legally binds states to
these rules of international law.239 So, as long as IGOs
stay within the limits of their mandate defined in their
230. Wolfrum (2008), above n. 222, at 6; Bodansky (1999), above n. 221, at
612; T.M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (1995),
at 7-8; and Hlavac (2008), above n. 224, at 204.
231. E. Hey, ‘Sustainable Development, Normative Development and the
Legitimacy of Decision-Making’, 12 Netherlands Yearbook of Interna-
tional Law 3, at 16 (2003); J. Klabbers, ‘The changing image of IOs’, in
J. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of IOs (2001) 221,
at 224-36; and Bodansky (1999), above n. 221, at 604.
232. N. Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postna-
tional Law, (2010), at 297.
233. Exceptions concern humanitarian law and international criminal law,
which directly address individuals.
234. All members are considered to be equal to each other.
235. Austin noted in his book The Province of Jurisprudence Determined
(1832) that law is a command of a sovereign to its subjects. See T.M.
Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’, 4 Americal Journal of
International Law 705 (1988), at 706, fn. 3.
236. As mentioned in the statute of International Court of Justice.
237. The state gives its explicit consent to treaties by concluding them,
whereas in the case of customary international law and internationally
recognized principles the implicit consent is conceived to be given by
state practice. See Wolfrum (2008), above n. 222, at 7-9 and E. Hey,
Teaching International Law: State-Consent as Consent to a Process of
Normative Development and Ensuing Problems, (2003).
238. Scholars identify two types of state consent: general and specific. The
authority of sources of international law is based on a specific state con-
sent, while the authority of IOs is based on the general consent. Bodan-
sky (1999), above n. 221, at 604-5. This general state consent thus
forms the basis of the law of IOs, which is reflected in two opposing
doctrines: the implied powers doctrine and the principle of attribution.
Klabbers (2001), above n. 231, at 224-36. The ‘implied powers’ doc-
trine is developed by the International Court of Justice in its 11 April
1949 case Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations (ICJ Reat 1949, at 180). This doctrine is based on the principle
of effectiveness. In short, it dictates that every IO has implied powers,
which are needed for reaching its purposes and exercising its explicit
powers. Alvarez (2001), above n. 182, at 116-7 and 121.
239. Hey (2003), above n. 231, at 15.
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founding documents, their activities are legal and at the
same time legitimate.
For a long time, this theoretically pre-supposed confla-
tion of the notions of legitimacy with the notion of legal-
ity through state consent corresponded not only with
the reality of that time, but appeared to be highly practi-
cal and efficacious in international legal practice. In the
recent decades, however, the rise of global problems in
conjunction with the legal empowerment of internation-
al institutions based on considerations of the ‘principle
of (institutional) effectiveness’240 has led to a shift of (a
large part of) the national decision-making authority to
the international level.241 Since the consensual-decision
making on the international level is, at the same time,
being replaced by flexible law-making approaches,242 it
results eventually in the break or prolongation of the
legitimacy chain towards the people who are affected by
the decisions taken on the international level.243 Conse-
quently, a growing group of people within and beyond
legal academia began to discern discrepancies between
the fundamental assumptions of this dominant para-
digm and the reality. This discrepancy raised the ques-
tion of adequacy of the state consent as the source of
legitimacy of international law. Accordingly, they pro-
posed many different solutions for the lack of legitimacy
that ensues from this discrepancy. Although these peo-
ple are a heterogeneous mixture of people, they could,
broadly speaking, be divided into two main distinct
groups: ‘nationalists,’ or those who propose to contain
and reverse the international developments, and ‘inter-
nationalists,’ or those who propose to accommodate
these developments. Both groups, however, agree with
each other that the state consent would have sufficed as
long as the two distinctive layers of the global legal
order – international and domestic – had remained in two
separate operational spheres.244 As to the second group,
it could be further divided into three subgroups. The
first subgroup emphasises the emergence of a truly
global political and legal order and, therefore, denies the
suitability of the dominant paradigm in its entirety by
proposing to replace it with a completely different
one.245 In contrast to it, the second subgroup discerns
only a partial convergence of the international and
domestic layers of the global order owing to the rise of
global problems.246 Consequently, they propose to
repair legitimacy deficits that resulted from it in certain
parts of international law development by either adapt-
240. This principle forms the basis of the implied powers doctrine. See above
n. 238.
241. All scholars seem to observe this process.
242. Bodansky (1999), above n. 221, at 606.
243. Wolfrum (2008), above n. 222, at 20.
244. Krisch (2010), above n. 232, at 297.
245. To this group of scholars belong constitutionalists and pluralists. The
seminal book written by the former group is: J. Klabbers, A. Peters & G.
Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (2009). For the
vision of pluralists, see Krisch (2010), above n. 232.
246. Hey (2003), above n. 237; E. Hey, ‘International Institutions’, in D. Bod-
ansky, J. Brunnée & E. Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Internation-
al Environmental Law (2008) 749, at 751; and Wolfrum (2008), above
n. 222, at 5. Ellen Hey calls these global problems ‘common interest’
problems, which concern everyone in the world.
ing the process of international norm development247 or
improving the governance structure of international
institutions that create these norms.248 The last sub-
group tries to amend the legitimacy gap by improving
the domestic ‘legitimacy chain’ by ‘strengthening the
national parliamentarian influence on the conduct of
international relations which is traditionally thought to
be domain of governments’.249
The number of theories and their differences between
them, however, do not allow a discussion of all details
and merits of these theories here. Nonetheless, this clas-
sification enables me to make a rough judgment on pos-
sible implications of the two informal decisions for the
Bank’s legitimacy. Whereas I think that we could be
sure that the two decisions have no implications if we
apply the dominant paradigm of international legal
scholarship, such a judgment cannot be made on the
basis of other theoretical traditions that are gaining more
and more influence within and beyond academia. Of
course, the Bank may feel itself safe with the dogma of
the dominant theory and think that it does not need to
take any actions to improve this legitimacy chain. But it
is better to play safe and take provisionary measures
since the tendency inclines to the direction of bringing
the ones that have the ‘right to rule’ closer to the people
that are ‘being ruled’. This direction of movement
seems to be visible not only in the aforementioned new
theories proposed by the scholars, but also on the
demands of non-governmental organizations and the
will of the political leaders belonging to the G20 with
their frequent calls addressed to the four major IGOs.
Although the G20 comprise non-elected officials of
some twenty economies in the world, it is, nonetheless,
aimed at shortening the chain of legitimacy at least with
regard to their constituencies.
It seems that the Bank is also aware of this general
movement as it has undergone owing to these new calls
for legitimacy some institutional facelift in recent deca-
des. The most recent and important of these adjust-
ments concern the revision of the previously mentioned
distribution of voting power in 2010. Moreover, one can
mention the establishment of the Bank’s ‘Inspection
Panel’ in 1993. This internal, yet independent, account-
ability mechanism investigates, on the basis of a request
from project-affected people, whether or not the Bank,
as a result of a failure to follow its operational policies
and procedures, adversely affects or is likely to affect by
its action or omission the rights and interests of the peo-
ple that have submitted complaints.250 Furthermore, a
big step into the direction of transparency was made
with the introduction of the Policy on Access to Infor-
247. Wolfrum (2008), above n. 222, at 4. The representatives of this group
are analytical positivists as Franck and constructivists as Brunneé and
Toope.
248. Representatives are, among others, Buchanan, Keohane and Hlavac.
249. Wolfrum (2008), above n. 222, at 5.
250. Section 12 of Resolution No. IBRD 93 and Resolution No. IDA 93 estab-
lishing the World Bank Inspection Panel, 22 September 1993.
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mation on 1 July 2010.251 This information policy
replaced the Bank’s old Information Disclosure policy
of more limited scope.252 As a result of two subsequent
modifications of this policy, respectively in 2013 and
2015, the public has now access to information about
projects under preparation, projects under implementa-
tion, analytic and advisory activities, and Board pro-
ceedings.253 Although these developments are to be
cheered, the changes largely focus on improvements of
the Bank’s governance structure, which depends on the
willingness of the large shareholders of this IGO. Fur-
thermore, the impact of these changes was of limited
scope since these developments did not aim to bring a
radical reform of the governance structure. For exam-
ple, the 2010 reform resulted only in a substantial
increase in the voting power of a few economies such as
China, India and Brazil, while it led to a negligible
increase – and even decrease in some cases – in the vot-
ing powers of some other developing members.254
It is not clear whether or not the Bank’s policy dialogues
and recommendations in its policy-based loans have
involved and still involve a pre-selected choice contain-
ing an ultimate tax policy norm that should be imple-
mented by the borrowing member. It looks like this was
the case in the past if we consider the Bank’s adjustment
loans with tax conditionality.255 However, the Bank’s
recently adjusted Bank Policy (BP) and Operational Pol-
icy (OP) 8.60 suggest otherwise.256 According to Para-
graph 9 of the BP 8.60: ‘In carrying out dialogue with a
Member Country, the Bank advises it to consult with
and engage the participation of key stakeholders [empha-
sis added] in the country in the process of formulating
its development strategies. Key stakeholders include
social groups directly affected by the operations, as well
as public sector, private sector and donor organizations
relevant to the operation. For a development policy
operation, the Member Country draws on this process
of strategy formulation to determine, in the context of
its constitutional and legislative framework, the form
and extent of consultations and participation in prepar-
ing, implementing, and monitoring and valuating the
operation.’ However, such a consultation does not
exclude the imposition of tax-related conditions from
the Bank, because the borrowing member state will need
to negotiate with the Bank on the loan conditions or
conditionality after its consultation with the so-called
key stakeholders. And it is even more the case since the
donor organisations relevant to the operation are also
mentioned as such stakeholders. If in practice such an
imposition takes place then it implies shift of the deci-
sion-making authority from developing members to the
international level. Although such a shift might be nec-
251. <www. worldbank. org/ en/ access -to -information/ overview#1> (last vis-
ited 9 October 2017).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See above n. 64 and 65.
255. More research is needed on this matter.
256. Bank Policy, ‘Development Policy Financing’, OPS5.02-POL.105, 2
August 2017 (Effective from 13 July 2017).
essary for tackling the international tax problems, a top-
down approach is not the only way of reaching that shift
and will even render the shift illegitimate. And since
having a legitimate authority means in part having lower
costs of implementation, this lack of legitimacy vis-à-vis
its client members will eventually lead to increased costs
of implementation for the Bank, its main shareholders
and eventually to the international community.
5 Conclusion
The Bank has now become one of the prominent players
in the field of taxation. Two informal decisions to
expand that were taken in the past have contributed to
the Bank’s current position. The first one was taken as
early as the late 1970s. As a result of this decision, the
Bank expanded its activities into the domestic tax field
of its clients and has subsequently evolved as their co-
legislator or legislative partner. It performed its co-leg-
islative role by attaching conditionality to its adjustment
loans at times when its clients were desperately in need
of financial resources. In other cases, it appeared as a
legislative partner for its clients through its frequently
held policy dialogues and on-demand advisory activities.
After the outbreak of the 2008 financial and economic
crisis, owing partly to the enhanced attention of the
G20, the Bank took its second decision to expand. This
time the Bank expanded into the international tax field.
As a result, international tax issues became another
component of the Bank’s tax-related work. Yet ques-
tions could be raised whether these informal decisions –
which in some cases result in significant constraint of
parliamentary authority in the Bank’s client member
states – were legal, and if so, what implications, if any,
they have for the Bank’s legitimacy. Based on the Bank’s
Articles and the current doctrines of international law, it
could be concluded that these informal decisions were
legal, even though the Bank’s Articles contain a serious
deficiency with regard to the provision of competent
authority for interpretations. The answer to the other
question, however, is not straightforward as much will
depend on the normative theory that is chosen to assess
the Bank’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, the tendency
inclines to the direction of bringing the ones that have
the ‘right to rule’ closer to the people that are being
ruled. This direction of movement seems to be visible
not only in the aforementioned new theories proposed
by the scholars, but also on the demands of non-govern-
mental organizations, the will of the political leaders
belonging to the G20, and the Bank’s own and its main
shareholders’ reform efforts. However, there is a need
for more reforms in order to make the Bank more legiti-
mate. For that purpose, not the top-down but the bot-
tom-up approach should be followed if the Bank wishes
to be legitimate vis-à-vis its client members and with
that reduce the costs of implementation for the Bank, its
main shareholders and eventually to the international
community.
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